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                                                 Abstract 
With the 1999 publication of the Basel Committee’s proposal for a New Capital Accord, 
Basel II, to replace the 1988 agreement, Basel I, an attempt has been made to address the 
problem of correlating banks’ risks and their management with capital requirements. The 
Basel II framework, finalised in June 2004, is designed to improve risk management by 
using models based on past performance to help set the amount of capital banks are 
required to hold by regulators, with the purpose of improving the efficiency of the global 
allocation of capital. The objectives of this study are to investigate the implications of the 
New Capital Accord for the banking community and, in particular, the response to these 
new international banking rules for the Chinese banking industry. The authors formulate 
three propositions, namely, Basel II will improve risk management; Basel II will improve 
capital allocation efficiency; and compliance with advanced risk management systems is 
predicated on Basel II and is biased in favour of the large banks. Following an extensive 
analysis of the New Capital Accord, evidence was assembled with which to evaluate 
these three propositions by gathering primary data from risk managers in the Chinese 
banking industry by means of a semi-structured tele-interview survey of twenty-four 
Chinese banks. The findings of the study strongly support the first two propositions and 
partly support the third proposition.     
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1.1 Background to the Study 
Market economies, with their inevitable inefficiencies and market failures, pose a 
challenge for regulators in their desire to ensure the equitable treatment of corporate 
stakeholders and to promote a stable economic environment. Over the years legal and 
regulatory frameworks have been developed in the West for regulating public companies 
which consists of laws, for example, Companies Acts, financial reporting standards 
(FRS), statements of standard accounting practice (SSAP), listing rules for companies 
listed on the stock exchange and international reporting standards (IFRS), the 
international convergence of capital measurement, and capital standards. Recently, the 
Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) was introduced for the purpose of opening up 
Europe’s capital markets by improving price transparency of traded financial instruments 
while also making it easier to execute trade across borders. 
Some key international regulatory groups have become central to the development of 
domestic regulatory regimes, such as the International Organisation of Securities 
Commission (IOSCO) for the securities’ markets, the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) for the insurance sector, and the Basel Committee for 
banking. The purpose of these institutions is to try to ensure that financial performance 
and the risk position of an entity is adequately reported to stakeholders who use financial 
information. Despite continuing attempts by the international regulatory bodies to 
harmonise international standards, differences in the treatment of asset valuation, 
differing calculations of regulatory capital and risk-based deduction methods exist in 
Europe and between Europe and the United Stated of America (USA) and countries of 
the far-East because of different national legal systems, financing methods and reporting 
systems.  
A most important aspect of risk management is capital control: Rowe et al  defined two 
major concepts which constitute the critical role of capital in the management of bank 
portfolios.1 Firstly, to assess and manage risks, a bank must effectively determine the 
appropriate amount of capital that is necessary to absorb unexpected losses arising from 
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its market, credit and operational risk exposures. Secondly, profits that arise from various 
business activities need to be evaluated relative to the capital necessary to cover the 
associated risks. With the publication in 2004 of the finalised new framework for the 
New Basel Capital Accord, the so-called, Basel II banking regulations, the Basel 
Committee, which devises banking regulations, has attempted to address the problem of 
correlating banking risks and their management with capital requirements (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision.2; 3  By redefining how banks worldwide calculate 
regulatory capital and report compliance to regulators and the public, Basel II is intended 
to improve safety and soundness in the financial system by placing increased emphasis 
on a banks’ own internal control and risk-management processes and models, the 
supervisory review process and market discipline.4; 5  
The complexity of the New Accord (it is over 600 pagers long) and its interdependencies 
with International Financial Reporting Standards and local regulations world-wide make 
implementation of Basel II a highly complicated undertaking.  The international 
convergence of capital measurement and capital standards from Basel II presents the 
banking community with a risk management challenge which has extensive strategic 
business implications. In this study, we investigate the implications of the New Capital 
Accord for the banking community and, in particular, the response to these new 
international banking rules for the Chinese banking industry. 
1.2 Overview of the Chinese Banking Industry 
The opening up of China to financial services has already begun and will continue to 
expand. However, the local financial services sector is still relatively young, and policy 
and regulation continue to develop alongside state-owned enterprise reform, management 
of non-performing loans, stock market expansion, relaxation of currency controls, and 
other critical issues. At present, the banking system includes four large state-owned 
commercial banks (SOCBs), three policy leading banks and a large number of other 
commercial banks, credit cooperatives and financial institutions (see Figure 1.1) which 
dominate China’s financial landscape as such indirect financing remains the main 




Figure 1.1: Structure of the Chinese Banking System  
 
Source: Herrero and Santabarbara (see ref 7)  
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The main concerns for China’s banks have centred on the high level of non-performing 
loans (NPLs), low level of associated loan loss reserves and inadequate capital. In recent 
years, there have been some very significant developments that address these issues, 
including moves to recapitalize and reform the state-owned banks and strengthen the 
country’s regulatory framework.8; 6; 9; 10 The key developments in China’s banking 
industry include the following:  
• The government recapitalises the Bank of China and Construction Bank of China 
with $45bn, accompanied by a one-time write-off of the two banks’ accumulated 
NPLs 
• These two banks were selected as pilot banks to convert the state-owned lenders 
into fully commercial companies with outside shareholders, modern corporate 
governance and stock market listings  
• The regulator body, the China Bank Regulatory Commission (CBRC) is 
introducing new prudential regulations, for example, The Provisional Risk 
Assessment System for Joint Stock Banks aims to improve the regulator’s ability 
to assess risk management and the Regulation Governing the Capital Adequacy of 
Commercial Banks aims to toughen up capital requirements   
• Foreign banks have begun purchasing stakes in domestic banks and conducting 
banking business, for instance, HSBC $17.5 billion purchase of a 19.9% share of 
Bank of Communications in 2004 and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) consortia’s 
purchase of 10% of the Bank of China (BoC) for £1.7bn in 2005.  
Some of the major problems which presently face Chinese banks include the following:  
• The reforms have not yet been applied to the largest bank, the Industrial 
Commercial Bank of China, or to the most troubled, the Agricultural Bank of 
China. If the economy begins to slow down, an extensive number of bad loans are 
likely to emerge 
• NPLs are still being understated by Chinese banks. This may not necessarily be 
because of any attempt by management or regulators to hide problems, but 
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because of the challenges faced by risk managers and regulators in China.8 Many 
bank officials like to report low and falling NPL ratios and make it likely that 
there is a bias towards over-generous classifications of credits 
• Corruption poses another problem for China’s banking system because loans are 
often made on the basis of political connections 
• The attempts to improve corporate governance have not shown clear results yet-
the shareholder boards are still a formality and substantial state-ownership biases 
the decisions taken by bank managers   
• Operational risk is probably large for the majority of the financial institutions 
because of poor internal controls.  
China has set out a five-year timetable for liberalising its financial services market, and it 
is hoped that by the end of 2006 foreign and domestic banks will be able to provide the 
same services throughout the country. According to Herrero and Santabarbara, 7 although 
it is still early to judge the success of the reforms, the available evidence does not offer a 
very optimistic outlook. The solvency of Chinese banks is still very weak, with a 
stubbornly high level of non-performing loans, and profitability is poor. Given the 
commitment of the Chinese authorities to fully open up its banking system to foreign 
competition, it seems crucial that financial reforms accelerate so that the Chinese banking 
system can compete internationally.  
As part of these reforms, China has agreed to bring its national accounting standards, the 
Chinese Accounting Standards System, into line with International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). From January 2007, China will adopt IFRS principles, including ‘fair 
value’, although keeping an exemption for state enterprises from the “related party” 
disclosure provisions because of the dominance of government enterprises. The 
implementation of “fair value” provisions is complicated because of the government’s 
control of the price of assets such as unlisted securities, and the inability to find 
independent parties to assess them. Another area in which China will maintain 
differences with IFRS is in the “impairment of assets” provisions, which allow 
companies to write down the value of businesses, physical assets and goodwill and to 
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value them upwards if conditions change - Chinese officials will follow the United States 
which also refuses to allow the revaluation upwards of assets already written down 
because of the fear that it leaves too much room for the manipulation of accounts.11 
1.3 Aims and Objectives of the Study 
Our objective is to investigate how the New Accord regulations, Basel II, are intended to 
improve risk management systems and what are the implications for Chinese banks. 
Following an extensive literature review of the field, three specific research questions 
framing the aims of this study were formulated as follows:  
1. Would the adoption of the New Capital Accord banking rules enable the Chinese 
banking industry to strengthen its risk management? 
2. In what ways could the Chinese banks improve the efficiency and quality of its 
capital allocations? 
3. Would the adoption of the New Accord banking regulations give the Chinese 
banks an economic advantage over its rivals? 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the nature of the risks 
involved in the financial services and banking sector of the economy and discusses the 
link between capital and risk, in particular, the distinction between economic and 
regulatory risk is explained and the implications of the Basel II banking regulations are 
critically assessed. In Section 3, the three above research questions are transformed into 
propositions susceptible to empirical investigation and the reasons for adopting the 
methodology used in the study are explained. Section 4 reviews the results of the primary 
data collection, and in Section 5, the findings are summarised and discussed, and 
recommendations are suggested for future risk management improvements in the Chinese 
Banking industry.   
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2: Literature Review 
2.1 Banking Risks Overview 
According to Jorion,12 risk can be defined in terms of unexpected losses. Risk 
measurement focuses on unexpected (profits) losses which lead to volatility in the 
earnings of a bank - ranging from lower profits to balance sheet losses, and potentially to 
insolvency. Generally speaking, banking risks are classified into the broad categories of 
market risk, credit risk, operational risk, liquidity risk, strategic risk and business risk.  
Market risks arise from unexpected changes in market parameters, such as interest-rate 
variations, foreign-exchange, and share-price movements, and credit-spread risks as well 
as risks relating to metals, commodities, equity investment and property. Credit risks 
arise from the default or credit rating downgrades which including issuer, counter-party, 
settlement, default and country risk. Operational risks arise from the inadequate or failed 
internal processes, people, and systems or from external events. Liquidity risks arise from 
liability-side reasons, such as depositors seeking to cash in their financial claims 
immediately; or arise from the difficulty of selling an asset. Strategic risks arise from 
incorrect decisions taken by senior management, such as the incorrect assessment of 
certain market segments, the wrong market approach, or an inappropriate internal 
organisational structure. Business risks arise from unexpected changes in business 
volume or margins, which included the risk of shrinking business volumes, rising costs 
for staff and IT, and falling revenues due to competitions.13; 14 
The standard measurement for risk is Value at Risk (VaR), referring to the amount of 
maximum possible loss for a given probability over a given time horizon. Risk-adjusted 
capital refers to the economic capital that is required to cover the unexpected losses up to 
a certain confidence level – the corresponding VaR figure. Even though the VaR enables 
comparison of various risk positions, VaR cannot express the complexity of a risk profile 
because VaR ignores infrequent events, for example, high loss potential, and some 
assumptions are not realistic, for example, market risk is not normally log-normally 
distributed. Therefore, stress scenario analysis was introduced as an important 
supplementary role in risk management using VaR. RARORAC is risk-adjusted return on 
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risk-adjusted capital which takes account of expected costs and losses as well as 
unexpected losses; and shareholder value-added (SVA) includes a measure for 
unexpected losses by adjusting expected or actual gross earnings with cost of capital. 
From an economic capital management point of view, RARORAC or SVA should be 
implemented for bank risk management. Figure 2.1 describes the formulas used.   
Figure 2.1: RARORAC and SVA formulas 
 
 
Source: KPMG (2003) Basel II – A Closer Look, Managing Economic Capital. (see ref 15.) 
Diversification, of course, has always been a key tool for risk management. A well-
diversified portfolio is less risky than a less-diversified portfolio. The portfolio effect 
refers to a single asset or liability which could make a different contribution towards risk 
in different portfolios. It is argued that that there are two important implications of 
portfolio effects for bank management: firstly, the risks of a particular asset or liability 
might have varying attractions for different banks depending on the structure of the 
portfolio; and secondly, identifying portfolio effects and allocating them to the particular 
assets and liabilities and their risks is crucial to improving the overall performance on the 
risk that has been taken.15 
2.2 Bank Capital Regulation and its Impact on Bank’s Risk-taking 
The Role of Bank Capital and Capital Regulation 
According to Modigliani and Miller (M&M), a firm’s weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC) is independent of its capital ratio.16 M&M argue that the mix between equity 
and debt should not be able to generate further corporate value as any decision on the 
capital structure of non-financial firms should not affect the overall cost of financing. 
However, capital in banks is not only a way of funding the business but it also plays other 
important roles. According to Allen and Santomero,17 banking capital, as a safety cushion, 
provides protections for banks’ equity holders and debt holders against unexpected or 
RARORAC = expected gross earnings – expected unit costs – expected losses 
amount of the risk 
                          
SVA = expected gross earnings – expected unit costs – expected losses –cost of capital
 11
temporary losses. Also, as Jorion12 argues, bank capital is a tool used by banks to signal 
to the public their profitability and it is considered by competitors, customers, and rating 
agencies as a proxy for soundness: it is an indication of shareholders’ value. 
Capital is associated with cost: pressures to increase or maintain return on equity (ROE) 
and profitability are always an important consideration for bank managers. Increased 
capital means less return on equity for banks unless it brings with it higher returns and 
excess capital may be under-utilized. Therefore, leverage has an important competitive 
effect. More highly-leveraged institutions can charge lower prices through less of a 
required spread, and earn the same return on capital as less highly-leveraged institutions. 
Therefore, the “right” capital level is a fundamental strategic decision. 18  
According to Kaufman,19 the structure of the bank’s balance sheet may be characterised 
by three features: low cash to assets (fractional reserve banking); low capital to assets 
(high leverage); maturity mismatch (combination of short-term liquid liabilities 
withdrawable on demand on a first-come-first-served basis and longer-term highly 
illiquid assets), and it is these three features which are also the source of financial 
fragility and the cause of regulatory concern. Capital regulation has become the principal 
regulatory response to deal with the problems of the bank’s balance sheet structure. In 
fact, the ability of capital standards to successfully eliminate these problems has been at 
the heart of a theoretical debate for more than 20 years. 
Some of the literature in this field focuses on utility-maximizing banks using the portfolio 
approach of Pyle20 and Hart and Jaffee21, and using this framework, Kim and 
Santomero,22  for example, conclude that the higher leverage ratios will lead banks to shift 
their portfolio to riskier assets, and one way to eliminate the risk-shifting incentive is to 
require banks to meet risk-related capital ratios.23  However, these conclusions have been 
questioned by several studies, for example, Furlong and Keeley24 and Keeley and 
Furlong,25 using an option model. They found that a utility-maximisation framework is 
inappropriate because it does not describe the bank’s investment opportunity set by 
neglecting the option value of deposit insurance and the possibility of bank failure.  
Furthermore, Blum26  finds that capital regulation may increase a bank’s riskiness but in a 
dynamic framework and suggests that if banks find it too costly to raise additional equity 
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to meet new capital requirements tomorrow or are unable to do so, they will increase risk 
today.  
We concluded from the above discussion, that although economic theory is unclear on 
whether imposing tighter capital requirements leads to an increase or a decrease in the 
risk structure of a bank’s asset portfolio, many empirical findings, such as Shrieves and 
Dahl,27 Jacques and Nigro,28 and Roy29 provide evidence for the importance of bank 
capital regulation for a “healthy” banking industry, including those in the emerging 
market economies. Many argue that risk-based capital requirements have become the 
only true internationally accepted standard of a bank’s soundness. Furthermore, capital 
adequacy is not only a core part of modern banking regulations, it has become a major 
strategic theme for bank management: capital adequacy mirrors market and institutional 
developments, and increased risk sensitivity, use of internal models, and reliance on 
market discipline are among some of the recent trends in finance which have influenced 
capital rules.  
Economic Capital and Regulatory Capital  
Economic and regulatory capital are two terms frequently used in the analysis of the new 
framework for bank capital regulation on Banking Supervision.3 In particular, many 
discussions preceding the publication of the new Basel II regulations have highlighted the 
objective of bringing regulatory capital closer to economic capital. The primary objective 
under the so-called, Pillar 1 of Basel II, is to better align regulatory capital requirements 
with economic capital demanded by investors and counterparties31 (see Section 2.4 
below). 
Regulatory capital is the minimum capital required by the regulator, whilst economic 
capital is defined as the capital level that is required to cover the bank’s losses with a 
given probability of risk.31 It is implicitly assumed that shareholders’ agents are choosing 
the risk strategy in order to maximise the market value of the bank. Therefore, the 
economic capital may be understood as the capital level that a bank’s shareholders would 
choose in the absence of capital regulation. Also, there is a further divergence 
compounded by the difference between accounting standards and regulatory capital 
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standards since the accounting notion of capital as net worth does not coincide with the 
regulatory notion of capital. 
According to Lastra,32 in the absence of protective bank regulation, it could be argued 
that efficient markets would lead to an optimal capital ratio. Therefore, distortions in 
bank decision-making will occur when regulatory constraints determine a bank’s choice 
of capital rather than market requirements. On the other hand, however, it may be argued 
that externally imposed capital requirements are needed, since banks may have an 
incentive to hold inadequate capital.  
2.3 Basel I 
Basel I and Key Elements 
The 1988 Basel standards are almost entirely focussed on credit risk, the risk of loss due 
to borrower or counterparty default (see Figure 2.2). An amendment to incorporate 
market risk was issued in 1996 (see Figure 2.3), whilst the New Basel Accord, Basel II, 
allows banks and supervisors to evaluate additional types of risk, including operational 
risk and interest rate risk, thereby avoiding treating portfolio risk in isolation (see Figure 
2.4).  
Figure 2.2: 1988 Basel Capital Accord 
 
Figure 2.3: 1996 Market Risk Amendment 
 
 
In the denominator, Basel I uses a ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets (RWA) (see 
Figure 2.4). Where bucket 1 consists of assets with zero default risk (e.g. cash, 
government bonds securities), bucket 2 of assets with a low rate of default (e.g. loans to 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) banks), bucket 3 of medium-risk 
Capital Ratio =                                    Total Capital 
Credit Risk +Market Risk (Market risk equivalent of trading) 
                          
Capital Ratio =                    Total Capital 
Credit Risk (RWA of banking book) 
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assets (essentially residential mortgage loans), and the remaining assets (in particular 
loans to non-banks) fall into bucket 4.33 Therefore, the RWA represents the accounting 
value of banks’ assets adjusted for their individual risk. 
Figure 2.4: RWA Formula 
 
In the numerator of the Basel I formula, capital is divided into Tier 1 and Tier 2. Tier 1 is 
equity capital plus disclosed reserves, minus good-will; Tier 2 is asset revaluation 
reserves, undisclosed reserves, general loan loss reserves, hybrid capital instrument and 
subordinated term debt. Figure 2.5 summarises the inequalities which must hold.  
Figure 2.5: Inequalities Requirement of Basel I 
 
 
Basel I and its Impact on Risk Management 
The 1988 Capital Accord (Basel I) guiding principle was devised to improve the safety of 
the financial system and requires banks to have an adequate ‘capital cushion’ to cover 
unexpected losses with 8% of capital to risk-weighted assets for banks (see Figure 2.6).  
As a simple and standard ratio, Basel I has been broadly accepted by the industry and by 







RWA=0*(bucket 1) + 0.2*(bucket 2) + 0.5*(bucket 3) + 1.0*(bucket 4) 
 Tier 1 ratio = Tier 1 capital / RWA ≥ 0.4 
 Total  capital ratio = Total capital / RWA = (Tier 1 capital + Tier 2 capital) / RWA ≥ 0.08  
 Tier 1 capital ≥ Tier 2 capital 
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Figure 2.6: Structure of the Basle Capital Accord 1988 
           
Source: HM Treasury (2003) (see ref 34)  
The Basel I Accord was criticised for not considering other relevent risks, such as interest 
rate risk, operational risk and liquidity risk. With regard to some of the elements included 
in Tier 2 capital, the problem of counting ‘debt’ as capital is that all debt has a maturity 
date, and there is a danger of relying on unrealised gains on long-term holdings of equity 
securities. Also, Basel I does not insist upon a risk differentiation, for example, zero 
percentage for Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and 
same 100% risk weight for corporate claims. As pointed out by Jones,35 banks may 
attempt to arbitrage between their economic assessment of risk and regulatory 
requirements, which can be done either by boosting capital ratios through “cosmetic 
arrangements” or by exploiting shortcomings in the measurement of risk through 
“regulatory capital arbitrage”, both methods allowing banks to misreport their effective 
capital ratios and/or credit risk.  Although the lack of data prevents measuring the extent 
to which these techniques were used by banks, it is likely that risk-weighted assets as 
defined by the 1988 Basel standards may not fully reflect the actual risk of a bank’s 
portfolio.36 
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Despite its limitations, however, the Basel I Accord has led to a general improvement in 
the capital position of banks around the world.  Banks have raised capital in different 
ways in order to meet the 8% target ratio of capital adequacy. According to Lastra,18; 32 
banks can increase the numerator of the Basel formula by selling shares (however, this 
might dilute the ownership of current shareholders) or increase retained earnings (by 
increasing profitability associated with increasing risk). 37 Banks also could decrease the 
denominator by selling assets, downsizing off-balance sheet exposures, and repositioning 
asset categories from higher to lower risk, through securitisation or other adjustment 
techniques. Bank mergers are another way of improving capital standards, for example, a 
lowly capitalised bank merging with a better capitalised one. Furthermore, in practice, the 
change in the asset portfolio through the repositioning of asset categories to lower risk, 
such as the market for securitisation, has been a solution favoured by many banks.  
In conclusion, as Roy29 points out, the evidence indicates that the 1988 Basel Accord 
provided banks with a higher capital buffer against insolvency and did not lead banks to 
engage in riskier activities. The policy implications for regulators are important as they 
suggest that the use of risk buckets to assess and limit credit risk-taking is likely to 
produce the desired effect. This approach to portfolio risk is currently being refined under 
the ‘standardised approach’ of the New Accord, Basel II, particularly for those banks 
which have the resources to use one of the more advanced ‘internal ratings-based 
approaches’. 
2.4 Basel II 
Basel II and its Three Pillars 
In July 2004, the finalised new framework for the New Basel Capital Accord, commonly 
referred to as Basel II, was published by the Basel Committee, with the intention to 
implement and standardise the foundation approaches by 2006, and the advanced 
approaches by the end of 2007. Basel II introduces a three-pillar concept that seeks to 





Figure 2.7: The Structure of the Proposed New Basel Accord 
 
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (see refs 2; 36; 38). 
Pillar I sets out minimum regulatory capital requirements – the amount of capital banks 
must hold against risks. It retains the Basel I minimum requirement of 8% target ratio of 
capital-to-risk-weighted-assets.  The market risk has not been changed but credit risk has 
been changed and operational risk has been introduced for the first time (see Figure 2.8), 
and the risk-weights are used has become more risk sensitive.3 





Pillar II defines the process for supervisory review of an institution’s risk management 
framework and, ultimately, its capital adequacy. It sets out specific oversight 
responsibilities for the board and senior management, reinforcing principles of internal 
control and other corporate governance practices established by regulatory bodies in 
various countries worldwide.32 
 
Capital Ratio =                    Total Capital 
Credit Risk +Market Risk + Operational Risk 
 
 










New risk capital 
charge 
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Pillar III aims to bolster market discipline through enhanced disclosure by banks. 
Enhanced comparability and transparency are the intended results. Calomiris and other 
members of the US Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee have advocated 
supplementing the Basel capital standards with an additional subordinated debt 
requirement to promote greater market discipline. This is because subordinated debt 
holders have an incentive to monitor the risks incurred by a bank, since they have a fixed 
income claim and, contrary to equity holders, are not entitled to share in upside gains by 
the bank.32  
Basel II and the Three Approaches to calculating Minimum Capital Requirement 
Basel II provides three approaches, of increasing sophistication, to calculate risk-based 
capital (see Figure 2.9).  
Figure 2.9: Approaches to Minimum Capital Requirement under the New Accord 
 
Source: Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (see refs 2; 36; 38). 
 
The first approach is the standardised approach, which relies on external ratings. The 
standardised approach refines the risk categories of the Basel I formula. For instance, risk 
weights for corporate credits (100% under Basel I) will range from 20% to 150% 
depending on their external rating. Sovereign debt risks-weights will no longer be 
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dependent upon whether a country is member or not of the OECD but rather on the 
external rating identified for the country. 3 
The second approach is the foundation internal rating-based approach, which allows 
banks to calculate their credit risk-based capital on the basis of their internal assessment 
of the probability of counterparty default. 3 
The third approach is the most sophisticated approach which is the advanced internal 
rating-based (AIRB) approach, which allows banks to use their own internal assessment, 
not only of the probability of default (PD), but also the percentage loss suffered if the 
counterparty defaults (LGD) and quantification of exposure to the counterparty, including 
event of default (EAD) and the facility’s remaining maturity (M). 3 
2.5 Basle II Implications and Implementation 
Basel II Implications 
Basel II will have consequences on a whole range of stakeholders in the banking industry. 
As Hashagen14  argues, implementing Basel II will be driven by the structure of a bank’s 
business – beginning with its strategy and encompassing its risk- measurement and 
capital calculation methods, business processes, data requirements, and information 
technology systems. Basel II’s capital requirements have wide-ranging implications for 
risk management and, thus, corporate governance. The main effects from Basel II in the 
debates surrounding its implementation have been focused on the following issues: 
banking business effects, economic capital and capital planning, new information and 
disclosure, reducing regulatory capital and implementation costs, global financial market 
stability, and bank consolidations. These issues are discussed in turn below. 4 
Banking Business Effects 
Commercial lending will be affected by Basel II. Basel I only provides one 100% risk-
weight category for ordinary corporate lending; whereas, Basel II will provide four 
categories: 20%, 50%, 100%, and 150%, with these risk-weights refined by reference to a 
rating provided by an external rating agency. High quality loans will attract a higher 
external rating and lower capital charge, which will result in more attractive pricing of 
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such loans. Furthermore, retail lending will benefit from the Basel II rules, in particular, 
mortgage lending will be reduced from 50% to 35% risk-weightings and credit card 
business and other consumer loans will also enjoy a drop in weightings from 100% to 
75%. This reduction in risk-weightings will be an incentive for banks to push more 
capital into retail activities.39 
Securitisation, however, is expected to be affected negatively by Basel II. The Basel 
Committee has developed a complex framework of capital charges for securitisation 
exposures both for banks using the standardised approaches and the internal-rating-based 
(IRB) approaches. This could discourage banks from actively managing their credit risk 
portfolios. In the USA the size of the securitisation market is an impressive $2.7 trillion. 
The Basel Committee recognises that asset securitisation can serve as an efficient way to 
redistribute credit risks of a bank to other banks or non-banking investors (risk 
diversification). The Committee, however, is concerned with the use of structured 
financing or asset securitisation to avoid minimum capital commensurate with their risk 
exposures (regulatory arbitrage). This may result in an overall risk-based capital ratio that 
is nominally high but which may obfuscate capital weakness in relation to the actual risks 
inherent in the bank’s portfolio (difference between regulatory capital and economic 
capital, discussed above).32; 39 
Economic Capital and Capital Planning 
Basel II is not intended to raise or lower the overall level of regulatory capital currently 
held by banks, but to make it more risk-sensitive. The spirit of the new Accord is to 
encourage the use of internal systems for measuring risks and allocating capital, and to 
align regulatory capital more closely with economic capital. Basel II requires that banks 
implement an economic capital management framework that assesses the overall capital 
adequacy in relation to their risk profile and a strategy for maintaining their capital 
levels.2 
Rowe et al1  argue that the challenge of determining economic capital lies in the fact that 
various risks a bank faces have a very different nature, are measured by different 
methodologies and are difficult to encapsulate in one common metric. Building an 
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economic capital framework assumes that banks find conceptual solutions to risk 
measurement, the definition of appropriate shareholder value metrics and the allocation 
of capital based on individual risk measures and their correlations. KPMG research 
provide a comprehensive capital planning process: identifying and measuring all material 
risks; the risk metric has to be compared with a bank’s capital; business-line and a bank’s 
performance need to be measured on a risk-adjusted basis; finally, monitoring and 
reporting regarding the actual as well as the future risk-return profile to ensure the 
sustainability of risk-taking.15 Therefore, economic capital frameworks imply key 
challenges in building comprehensive data structures and supporting technology as well 
as mastering significant cultural change. In practice, the cultural challenge and its 
implications for staff incentives and compensation is often one of the main causes for the 
failure of capital management projects.1; 15 
New information and disclosure 
Banks will need to collect and disclose new information and face the implications of 
increased transparency.  
As the New Accord recognises, banks should measure their performance against risk 
factors other than market share or expected return. Using quantitative methods to manage 
risk requires high-quality data. Adequate and comprehensive information enable banks to 
attribute risk to a potential transaction; ascribe a portion of economic capital to it and 
define an expected return on it; and, thereby, decide whether to enter a transaction or 
whether to engage in a business. Also, better information will help enable banks to 
improve overall risk management, which in turn is expected to prompt improvements in 
corporate governance, transparency, and the value of disclosures.40 Furthermore, banks 
will need to request better information from borrowers to perform the internal rating 
assessments and the collateral evaluation.14 However, many argue that the new 
information requirements would add lengthy additional disclosures which are highly 
technical in nature and which will be of little benefit to investors and the public at large. 
Rather than requiring the disclosure of a pile of highly technical data, Pillar 3 (which is 
intended to enhance market discipline through increased public disclosure requirements) 
should establish a general set of principles.41 
 22
Reducing regulatory capital and implementation costs 
Basel II is likely to be costly to implement, complex to understand and prescriptive in its 
numerous recommendations. Basel II favours active risk management and in preparation 
for its adoption many banks are improving their internal models. The costs of compliance 
with the IRB approach are significant, ranging from investments in data collection and IT 
systems to training and recruiting staff. Credit Suisse, for example, estimates the initial 
cost to be around $100m just to implement the system, plus substantial ongoing costs 
which could be as high as $125 million.39 
The incentive for a bank to make these investments in risk management and new 
technologies is that banks hope to use models to reduce the overall amount of regulatory 
capital and increase their return on equity.42 Suiter43 suggests that for a large bank with 
risk weighted assets of €500 billion, cutting the amount of capital by just 0.5% could save 
€2.5 billion.  Banks are ready to make investments in Basel II in the expectation that their 
overall amount of regulatory capital will be reduced, and hence resources can be freed-up 
to apply against new business. However, an overall reduction in the amount of capital is, 
would be contrary to the stated objective of the Basel process, which is intended to 
improve the stability of the banking system. 44; 45; 46 
Global financial market stability and bank consolidation 
An improved risk management, enhanced information flows, and related disclosures in 
the banking industry could drive parallel improvements in the stability of global financial 
markets. New disclosure provide regulators with early warnings that banks or rating 
agencies could then pass on to the public and to investors, potentially enhancing trust in 
financial markets. Basel II will also affect financial institutions that do not have to 
comply with it! Such non-banks or near banks may not have to fulfill Basel II’s 
potentially extensive disclosure requirements or make investments in managing 
operational risk, but as the standards are generally raised for risk management across the 
global market, such institutions are likely to seek to enhance their own risk management 
techniques by adopting those implied by the New Accord. The consequences of this 
convergence of standards should be improvement in global market stability.15  
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Critics47; 48 suggest, however, that Basel II will be pro-cyclical (and thus exacerbate the 
swings in the economic cycle and increase volatility), since banks will require more 
capital when companies are downgraded, but the Basel Committee has taken some steps 
to reduce pro-cyclicality. It requires banks to carry out ‘stress tests’ under Pillar 2 by 
calculating how much capital would be needed in a crisis. Moreover, if emerging 
economies and developing countries, such as China and India, do not adopt Basel II, it 
raises the concern that Basel II will exacerbate the already high volatility of capital flows 
to emerging economics.  
Regional Implementation  
Given the range of implementation approaches, degrees of emphasis and flexible rollout 
plans, overall, the level of preparedness of banks for Basel II is widely diverse. 
Significant gaps remain in preparedness between large Western European and North 
American banks and a handful of Asia Pacific-based banks, and the smaller banks, 
particularly, in the emerging market economies. In China, for example, regulators are 
allowing longer periods for the implementation of Basel II. 6 
According to a survey conducted by Ernst and Young in 2005,49 many banks are moving 
forward with details of their implementation programmes. The survey clearly indicates 
that awareness of and preparation for Basel II in the emerging markets and developing 
countries has increased significantly over the past two years. While smaller banks 
generally lag far behind, larger institutions in the region are well into their execution of 
implementation plans. Regional regulators are at varying stages in finalizing local 
implementation plans and many are adopting roll-out plans not in line with the 
international (G10) timeline. The large banks in Japan, Korea, Singapore and Australia 
are currently the most aggressive in pursuing advanced Basel II approaches to meet a 
2007 implementation.    
The European Commission (EU) has issued a draft of a revised directive – Capital 
Requirements Directive - on new capital adequacy rules based on the New Accord. Basel 
II will be received as a recommendation by the EU, which will convert it into EU 
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legislation applicable to all legislation to locally appropriate laws, subject to local 
regulator interpretation and ongoing supervision.34 
In the USA, all US banking regulators have been supportive of Basel II. They have 
indicated that Basel II implementation will be required for a small number of 
internationally active banks (about eight banks representing about two-thirds of US 
banking assets and 99% of the foreign assets held by the top 50 domestic US banking 
organisations), In addition, the stated intention is to allow only the Advanced IRB 
approach to credit risk for those banks, and similarly, only the advanced measurement 
approaches to operational risk will be permitted.50 
2.6 Implications for the Chinese Banking Industry 
There is now growing pressure on all countries which wish to participate in global 
markets to meet global standards of regulation in banking, securities, and insurance. In 
principle, this pressure has always existed, but in the past many countries have only 
nominally complied with global standards. Some of the internationally active banks have 
not held anything approaching 8% capital as required by the Basel I & Basel II. That was 
partly because regulators themselves were not sufficiently stringent, but also because the 
accounting standards adopted in some countries left a lot to be desired and which makes 
the true position hard to assess. This became very clear in the analyses of the late 1990s 
Asian crisis. Some banks which had reported satisfactory capital ratios for some time 
were, in effect, bankrupt even before the crisis.51  
Many studies49; 50 suggest that extended timeframes for the implementation of the Basel 
II should not be viewed by banks as an excuse for inaction because the additional time 
will still be necessary given the significant preparatory work required in dealing with the 
particular deficiencies in the Chinese banking industry, including data gathering, risk 
management systems and processes. However, there is concern as to whether the efforts 
and significant investments to be made will provide the value and benefit beyond simply 
compliance.  
Compliance with international regulatory standards is close to becoming a condition of 
access to IMF support. The IMF is carrying out a series of financial sector assessment 
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programmes which review the performance of an individual country against international 
standards of best practice in a highly detailed way.51  Such pressure is reinforced by the 
efforts of regulators in the major financial centres. In the past, some of these regulators 
have been ready to accept financial institutions whose capital does not match 
international standards because financial centres tend to compete with each other on the 
volume of business. However, there is now much less willingness to accept 
undercapitalized or badly managed institutions because the risks seem too great, 
especially if there is a serious risk of default or of fraudulent trading. Therefore, countries 
with inadequate financial regulation find themselves under two sorts of pressure – first 
from the IMF, and secondly, from other countries which refuse to accept their 
institutional standards. Moreover, there is pressure due to extra-territorial legislation 
arising particularly from the US. For example, the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act allows the US 
regulators to take action against any firms which are offering investment opportunities to 
US residents, wherever those investments are located. Therefore, China, as the recipient 
of the largest inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) from the USA and USA’s 
biggest the trading partner, cannot ignore the reach of US regulators and international 
standards if they wish to have access to the global capital markets.52; 53  Sarbanes-Oxley, 
IFRS, Basel II and MiFID, when seen as a collective, can trigger the pressure on all 
countries which wish to participate in global capital markets.54  
3: Methodology 
3.1 Research Design 
We wish to examine the ways in which risk management in the Chinese banking industry 
could be improved and what the implications of Basel II and the new regulatory 
framework being introduced for Western banking industry might have for China. We 
considered that semi-structured tele-interviews were well-suited to explore our 
propositions because we needed to obtain responses from a sample that is geographically 
spread. As Sekaran55 observes, semi-structured tele-interviews elicit an immediate 
response from interviewees and are thus an efficient way to collect data from individuals 
who are widely dispersed and at great distance.  
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Weaver et al56 argue that social desirability bias is a risk in any ethics-related study and 
as a consequence of this, an attempt was made to minimise the socially desirable 
responses by ensuring that the interviews did not clearly focus on the effectiveness of the 
individual manager’s initiatives. Respondents were informed that the questions concerned 
formal policies, procedures, and management characteristics and that the study was an 
attempt to assess overall company management and future expectations. Also, a main 
disadvantage of telephone interviewing is the respondent could unilaterally terminate the 
interview without warning or explanation by hanging up the phone. In order to efficiently 
collect data and get quick responses, the tele-interview was implemented in the following 
ways:  
(1) The panel of interviewees was carefully selected from a list of banking executives 
provided by the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and some of the 
foreign banks who have been operating in China.  
(2) These individuals were then contacted by telephone and in some cases by email in 
order to illicit a response and thus complete the primary data gathering for the 
study.  
(3) In order to eliminate the possibility of differences in cultural perceptions or 
knowledge misunderstanding of the technical language during discussions, it was 
decided that the interviewer would systematically describe key concepts 
associated with Basel II (see Appendix A), and to enhance the interest of 
respondents. Those who cooperated by providing an interview could request that 
an abstract of the findings of this study be sent to them, and their anonymity was 
guaranteed by specifying that no name or other identification would be used in 
the recording of the data supplied. 
(4) Twenty-four banks agreed to participate in the survey (see Appendix A). The 
interviewees were initially given an approximate idea of the interview time and a 
mutually convenient interview time was set-up.  
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3.2 Propositions and Interview Questions 
Three specific research questions framing the aims of this study were formulated as 
follows:  
1. Would the adoption of Basel II regulations strengthen the risk management of 
the Chinese banking industry? 
2. Would Basel II improve the efficiency and quality of the Chinese banking 
industry’s capital allocations? 
3. Would the adoption of the Basel II rules give the Chinese banks an economic 
advantage over rivals? 
These three research questions were reformulated as three propositions, namely, that 
Basel II will improve risk management - reducing the risk of business failure, and 
strengthening the global financial system; that Basel II will improve capital allocation 
efficiency; and that compliance with advanced risk management systems favours the 
large banks only, which gain the greatest capital relief - regulators are concerned about 
falls of perhaps 20% for the large banks following implementation of Basel II if no 
standardised risk measure is used - and benefit from economies of scale. The questions 
devised for the semi-structured tele-interviews in order to evaluate the three propositions 
are summarised in Table 3.1 below.  
Table 3.1: Tele-interview Questions 
Proposition 1 Basel II will improve risk management: reducing the risk of 
business failure, and strengthening the global financial system. 
Questions 
1. Do you think the application of the New Accord – the Basel II 
banking regulations – will reduce the risk of business failure? 
2. Will Basel II influence the way banks in China manage and 
measure risk? 
3. Will Basel II affect corporate governance and strengthen the 
stability of the financial system? 
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Proposition 2   Basel II will improve capital allocation efficiency. 
Questions 
1. Will Basel II affect the capital structure of Chinese banks? 
2. Are foreign banks investing in Chinese banking partnerships 
concerned that banks in China are not adopting the Basel II 
regulatory standards? 
3. Do you think that even those financial service institutions that 
are not required to comply with the New Accord, will, 
nevertheless, tend to use its advanced requirements as risk 
management and economic capital benchmarks in order to 
remain internationally competitive?  
 
Proposition 3 Compliance with advanced risk management systems favours the 
large banks only, which gain the greatest capital relief under 
Basel II, and benefit from economies of scale.  
Questions 
 
1. Will your bank use an advanced internal ratings based   
approach (AIRB)? 
2. Will the advanced internal ratings based approach (AIRB) 
allow banks to hold lower levers of capital? 
3. Do you think that non-compliance with the Basel II 
regulations will reduce banking competitiveness?   
 
 
3.3 Methodological caveats  
The reliability and validity of semi-structured interviews cannot be tested rigorously, 
although every effort was made to ensure that the questions were designed to gather 
primary data which specifically and validly addresses the stated propositions to be 
explored in this study.  Clearly, semi-structured interviews as a research method have 
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their limitations and caution needs to be taken in any attempt to generalise the findings 
derived from such a qualitative approach. For example, response errors may occur when 
respondents intentionally or unintentionally give inaccurate answers to questions and 
feelings such as annoyance, boredom and misunderstanding, inability to answer and 
refusal to answer questions can influence the outcome of the interview. To avoid such 
bias in data collection, the interviews were very carefully designed and conducted with 
sensitivity to the respondent’s role in their organisation. As stated above, senior 
executives from twenty-four major Chinese banks were interviewed and are listed in 
Appendix A). We believe this sample of respondents provided us with a reasonably 
representative cross-section of Chinese banking opinion. 
 
4: Review of Results 
Proposition 1:  Basel II will improve risk management: reducing the risk of business 
failure and strengthening the global financial system. 
The underlying rationale of Basel II is the Committee’s conviction that safety and 
soundness in today’s dynamic and complex financial system can be attained only by the 
combination of effective bank-level risk management, supervision, and market discipline 
(the model of the three pillars).39  
There was a 96% agreement amongst the respondents to question 1, Proposition 1, that 
that Basel II banking regulation will reduce the risk of business failure (see Appendix B).  
The respondents recognised Basel II provides for a more risk-sensitive determination for 
capital underlying credit risk, and for the first time requires capital for operational risk. It 
also establishes supervisory review and calls for new disclosure rules, intended to 
increase market discipline. However, it is not intended to change the aggregate level of 
capital in the system. Rather, the proposal aims at reallocating capital requirements, and 
aligning regulatory capital more closely to economic risk, which means that more capital 
will be needed for the riskier activities and less for those where there is little risk. This 
increased risk sensitivity should provide an incentive for innovation, encouraging more 
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sophisticated risk management systems and practices, and reduce the risk of business 
failure.  
In answer to question 2, Proposition 1, 75% of the respondents considered that Basel II 
rules will influence the way banks in China will manage and measure risk, although 17% 
of respondents disagreed that Basel II is compatible with Chinese banking system, and, 
therefore, will not have significant influence on risk management measurement (see 
Appendix B, P).  According to the respondents, the most challenging issue for banks in 
China is credit risk. Basel II allows banks to choose from either the Standardised 
Approach which uses external ratings, or the IRB Approach which uses data from 
internal management systems to calculate credit risk. Banks in China are using an 
internationally accepted five-category loan classification system, and yet, external ratings 
have not been established and banks either lack or have inadequate historical data to 
adopt the IRB Approach. Furthermore, it became clear to the researchers that credit 
decisions in China tend to rely significantly on relationships rather than on objective 
assessment criteria including the use of credit ratings models (providing a comparative 
advantage to domestic banks against their foreign competitors). Hence, it was thought 
that many banks in the region will experience some degree of resistance as staff, 
preoccupied with meeting business targets, may not comply with the new rules. 
Implementing appropriate risk control policies and ensuring that business management 
adhere to them would require conscious change management programmes over a long 
period of time.  
Respondents also noted that operational risk was a key issue which was not a focus of 
management. Some suggested that most of the operational risks were dealt with up-front 
in terms of documentation and that this is where the bulk of the risk lay.  The CBRC 
suggested a weak ability to handle risk in bank operations has become increasingly 
prominent. There are numerous recent examples of mismanagement and fraud. For 
example, a former branch head Liu Guangyi of China Construction Bank was jailed in 
2005 for embezzling $13.4m; a former Bank of China employee was arrested in 2005 in 
connection with the alleged embezzlement of $6m; the chairman of the China 
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Construction Bank, Zhang Enzhao, was sentenced in 2006 to life imprisonment for 
corruption.  
In China, domestic banks have been preoccupied with addressing structural deficiencies 
such as NPLs and meeting minimum capital requirements under the current regulations. 
However, some respondents were concerned that where a bank disposes of NPLs to an 
Assets Management company at a great downgrade, that individuals could take advantage 
through these transactions. The corruption and in-sider trading make disposing of NPLs 
to meet minimum capital requirements more problematic. Of course, the introduction of 
Basel II would put further pressure on the authorities to embrace and implement market 
reforms. In this respect, the international standards are expected to accelerate the need for 
reform and the need for individual banks in China to prepare to compete effectively in the 
global environment.  
In response to question 3, Proposition 1, 79% of the respondents believed that the 
adoption of Basel II would affect corporate governance and strengthen the stability of the 
financial system (see Appendix B). The CBRC regulators and major banks in China do 
recognise the importance of the new Basel II framework in improving financial stability 
and realise that there could be benefits beyond compliance and regulatory capital 
reduction. Regulators are concerned that in some banks there are inadequate rules, no 
proper supervision of the implementation of those rules, lenient punishment for violations, 
weak management and poor internal controls, all of which lead to major financial 
problems. CBRC has recognised that with foreign-invested banks conducting more 
business in China, a healthy risk management system could gain competitive advantage 
through improved market perception, use of risk-rating tools, improved operational 
efficiency and the ability to offer competitive and innovative products and services and 
open-up international capital markets. 
Proposition 2: Basel II will improve capital allocation efficiency. 
In answer to question 1, Proposition 2, 71% of the respondents considered that Basel II 
will significantly affect the capital structure of banks (see Appendix B). The revision of 
the capital adequacy regime along the lines of Basel II is of great significance for the 
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banking sector and affects all financial institutions, regardless of whether they will 
implement Basel II right away or not as it impacts banks’ counterparties and 
competitors.39  
Basel II will bring regulatory capital more in line with economic capital and is likely to 
affect the strategic decision-making at banks relating to which business lines to pursue.  
Under the Basel II rules, the economic capital is perceived as relevant primarily for 
internal management purposes as well as external pressures due to rating agencies 
demands and regulatory requirements. Basel II’s risk-sensitive approach allows banks to 
determine capital adequacy based on the level of risk posed by each transaction. Banks 
will develop and use various models to allocate capital to transactions based on how 
much risk an individual transaction contributes to the bank’s portfolio of risks. These 
models would help determine how much capital is required to support the various risks 
taken by the bank. It is expected that banks will streamline their business portfolios and 
focus their activities on where they have a competitive advantage. This is likely to have 
substantial consequences for the industry and will offer financial institutions 
opportunities to reposition themselves, for example, unsophisticated banks facing a 
potential increase in their capital charge could be bought by more sophisticated banks.  
The New Accord’s risk management requirements are likely to prompt big changes in the 
core business of an individual bank as well as its organisational structure. In response to 
question 3, Proposition 2, 75% of our respondents thought that even those financial 
service institutions that are not required to comply with the New Accord, will, 
nevertheless, tend to use its advanced requirements as risk management and economic 
capital benchmarks in order to remain internationally competitive (see Appendix B). 
Aside from new or altered methods that must be employed, the new capital requirements 
will also drive change in resource needs, processes, and IT system architecture. These 
changes could ultimately pose broad challenges for a bank’s board of directors and its 
senior management, who are charged with new risk management and reporting 
responsibilities under the New Accord. They will need to consider how Basel II 
compliance could integrate with other efforts they are making to improve corporate 
governance. New disclosures would provide regulators will early warnings that banks or 
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rating agencies could pass on to the public and investors, potentially enhancing trust in 
the financial market. This is because implementation of Basel II is not just a data and 
information systems exercise, but involves focusing on risk measure, risk allocation and 
the return on risks. Basel II is intended to stimulate the evaluation of a bank’s choice of 
core businesses and also the development of better corporate government practices.  
Respondents in this study understood the importance for China of implementing the 
global Accord on Basel II, although they believe it is going to be difficult for Chinese 
banks to comply with the new capital requirements even in the medium term. Apart from 
technical problems, the lack of regulatory expertise is also a major concern: respondents 
confirmed in general discussions that about 85% of CBRC staff are transferred from the 
central bank’s administration departments or monetary control departments. Given the 
complexity and specialisation required, it is difficulty to comply without properly trained 
staff.  
Foreign companies have been positioning themselves to take advantage of the opening of 
China’s banking sector to full competition, a precondition of China’s admission to the 
WTO. In question 2, Proposition 2, 67% of our respondents considered that foreign banks 
investing in Chinese banking partnerships are concerned that banks in China are not 
adopting the Basel II regulatory standards (see Appendix B). However, corruption, fraud 
and the large burden of NPLs in Chinese banks are major concerns of foreign banks. For 
example, after the RBS consortia bought its 10% stake in the Bank of China, the RBS 
shares dropped 8% because of such investors’ fears. Therefore, improving risk 
management systems and corporate governance can only help banks in China improve 
their international reputation and build-up investor confidence.  
Proposition 3: Compliance with advanced risk management systems favours the 
large banks only, which gain the greatest capital relief under Basel II, and benefit 
from economies of scale. 
The CBRC is now actively encouraging the nation’s major lenders to intensify their 
efforts to build an IRB approach compatible with Basel II requirements and improve their 
risk management capabilities. However, in response to question 1, Proposition 3, less 
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than 10% of the respondents were considering using an advanced internal rating based 
approach (AIRB) in their own banks due to lack of historical data and lack of expertise 
required to develop advanced models (see Appendix B).  Only two large banks expressed 
their intention to develop AIRB.   
Basel II QIS3 report (BIS, 2003) on 260 banks from over 40 countries2 suggests that, on 
average, large G10 banks, referred to as ‘Group 1’ banks, would face an overall increase 
of regulatory capital compared to the requirements under the current Accord when 
applying the Standardised and IRB Foundation Approach (+10.5% and +2.6%, 
respectively) and decrease of 1.6% when using the IRB Advanced Approach (AIRB). 
‘Group 2’, the smaller banks, would see their regulatory capital increase by 3.4% under 
the Standardized Approach and decrease substantially by 19.4% when using the IRB 
Foundation Approach  (see Figure 4.1) ,  although they may lack the necessary financial 
resources and technical skills to develop the internal systems they would need to follow 
the IRB Approach.57   
Figure 4.1: Average Percentage Change in Minimum Regulatory Capital Required 
Relative to Current Accord for Large and Small G10 Banks 
 
(see ref 2) 
However, in response to question 2, Proposition 3, 42% of our respondents considered 
that AIRB would allow banks to hold lower levels of capital (see Appendix B). Thus 
these respondents agreed with many observers that Basel II would put the world’s largest 
banks at an advantage because of the high costs of compliance with AIRB, which allows 
the greatest capital relief under Basel II, and of maintaining advanced risk management 
systems, which favours economies of scale.62; 58  QIS 5 findings in 2006 further confirms 
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that the average single-digit minimum capital requirement declines for large diversified 
banks.2 
The potential benefits from capital savings when compared to the cost of implementation 
are less clear in China. Some studies argue that capital savings in relation to credit risk 
will be offset by additional capital requirements for operational risks and costs to adopt 
the framework across operating units in the region.54; 59; 65 Deloitte50 suggests that 
aggregate costs for Chinese compliance with Basel II is estimated to be no less than 
US$50 million per bank. If the required planning and implementation are not properly 
executed then excessive building of new systems and delays may increase costs. 
However, most of the respondents of this study argue that Deloitte’s50 estimation is not 
based on the reality in China, and because implementation of Basel II is evolving the real 
cost will be far below this estimation.  
In response to question 3, Proposition 3, two-thirds of the respondents believed that 
implementing Basel II requirements will be worthwhile in view of future benefits, 
implying that the cost is not a major concern, at least, for the big banks in China(see 
Appendix B). According to the interviewees from CBRC, no banks in China have 
officially adopted the IRB (or AIRB) approach so far. However, some banks are making 
great efforts to prepare for complying with Basel II rules. For example, the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the nation’s largest lender, started to study the 
implications of Basel II in 2004. The ICBC has already opened a Basel II office, an IRB 
report has been completed and it is constructing an integrated infrastructure in order to 
fully implement the Basel II rules. Given the banking industry regulators’ willingness to 
get Basel II implemented in China, all of the nation’s big banks have drawn up plans to 
put the new international standards into practice.  
The Chinese government has encouraged limited foreign investment in banks (foreign 
companies can hold just 25% of a bank’s shares with any individual bank is limited to 
owning a 19.9% stake). Given that most of Chinese domestic banks are poorly capitalised, 
poorly managed and poorly regulated, restrictions on foreign competitors’ free access to 
Chinese markets can offer some protection to domestic banks being acquired or even 
prevent their collapse. Twenty-five of the respondents, however, argued that protecting 
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financial systems from all forms of international competition is counter-productive (see 
Appendix B). Also, according to China’s WTO commitment, by 2007, foreign banks will 
enjoy full banking licenses. Also, major Chinese banks find it increasingly necessary to 
set-up overseas subsidiaries and comply with differing regulatory regimes (home/host 
country supervisor coordination). Under the Basel II rules, banks that class some of their 
overseas operations as subsidiaries will be required to hold additional capital to cover the 
potential risks of insolvency.60  
Two-thirds of the respondents were of the opinion that non-compliance with the Basel II 
regulations would reduce banking competitiveness in the long-run (see Appendix B). 
They recognised that the only way domestic banks will be able to weather the storm of 
increased competition, especially with the opening-up of the sector to foreign lenders in 
line with China’s WTO commitments, is to establish a sound risk management system 
based on the new Basel Accord requirements. Once Chinese banks’ services are on a par 
with those of their foreign rivals, the next step in competition would be to improve how 
well they manage risks and find business opportunities. 
5: Conclusions 
5.1 Review of the findings 
China has made some reforms of its banking system in recent years including, changing 
supervision from the central bank (PBOC) to CBRC (established in April 2003 to act as 
an independent banking supervisory authority under the State Council of the government); 
restructuring state-owned banks; issuing subordinated debt; and passing the Law on 
Commercial banks (1995) and its amendment (2003) as well as the Law of Banking 
Supervision (2003) which incorporates the Basel II’s pillars 2 and 3, however, Basel II, is 
still perceived as challenging for China.64   In the first place, the Chinese banks have been 
undercapitalized for some time. This is because of a history of economic and financial 
volatility, and the institutions in question were previously used by politicians and policy 
markers to promote economic development. For some years, the state-owned banks, 
acting as funding mechanisms, did not make independent credit decisions, and directed 
funds to state owned enterprises without adequate consideration of the likelihood of 
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earning an appropriate return. Also, until recently, there has been little tradition of stock 
market financing whether through equities or bonds: investors are put-off by poor 
regulatory controls, the lack of transparency, and the absence of adequate protection for 
minority shareholders.61; 62 
A shortage of people in China with financial regulatory expertise is a great handicap.  
Experts are highly sought after by financial firms which can usually afford to pay 
considerably higher salaries than can the national regulators. Also, the growing 
complexity of the international environment makes it more difficult and more costly to 
train people to operate within it and there are cultural aspects to the training of regulators 
which are equally important.51; 63 In China, the distinction between the government sector 
and the financial sector has not been clear in the past because most of the financial 
institutions were owned by the government, which makes it difficult to establish a 
relationship which is one of questioning and challenging.64  
Furthermore, meeting Basel II requirements is very complex and requires sound change 
and programme management capabilities: the implementation challenges range from 
strategy and operations, organisation structure and design to technology and market 
specific issues. Also, as some critics have pointed out, most of the international 
regulatory standards have been developed without reference to the particular needs of 
developing countries, therefore, it will be more difficult to implement in these less 
sophisticated markets, including China.47; 51; 65  
The ability of capital standards to successfully eliminate the problems of bank’s balance 
sheet structure has been debated for the last 20 years, as Kaufman19 observes. Following 
an extensive review of the literature in the field, three propositions were formulated, 
namely, Basel II will improve risk management: reducing the risk of business failure, and 
strengthening the global financial system; Basel II will improve capital allocation 
efficiency; and compliance with advanced risk management systems favours the large 
banks only, which gain the greatest capital relief under Basel II, and benefit from 
economies of scale. Data were obtained from a series of semi-structured tele-interviews 
conducted with a carefully selected panel of Chinese banking executives knowledgeable 
in the field in order to evaluate the three propositions.  
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Proposition 1 was strongly supported by 83% of all the respondents, based upon their 
positive response to the three questions that were formulated to express proposition 3 (see 
Appendix B). These risk managers considered that the improvements in risk management 
proposed by Basel II would help to enhance risk management culture, reduce volatility, 
lower provision for bad debts, reduce operational losses, improve institutions’ external 
ratings, help ensure access to capital markets, and enhance organisational efficiency. 
There appears to be a convergence of opinion that risk-based capital requirements have 
became the only true internationally accepted standards of a bank’s soundness, 27; 28; 31; 29; 
12 and, as Lastra18  argues, the “right” capital level is a foundation strategic decision. The 
New Accord is expected to accelerate the need for reform and the need for Chinese banks 
to build up a healthy risk management system: credit risk and operational risk were 
considered to be the most challenging issues.  
Proposition 2 was also strongly supported by 71% of the respondents, again, based upon 
their positive responses to the three questions formulated to express proposition 2 (see 
Appendix B) – these risk managers considered that the Basel II rules would improve 
capital allocation efficiency, bringing regulatory capital more in line with economic 
capital, and would be likely to affect the strategic decision-making for banks, allowing 
them to manage their portfolios more efficiently and focus their activities on where they 
have a competitive advantage. Identifying portfolio effects and their risks, and allocating 
them to the particular assets and liabilities tends to improve the risk-adjusted return.1; 15  
These findings reinforce the idea of a strong consensus for the primary objective under 
Pillar 1 of Basel II which is to enable banks to achieve better alignment of regulatory 
capital with economic capital.30; 28; 35 Basel II’s risk-sensitive approach allows banks to 
efficiently determine capital adequacy based on the level of risk posed by each 
transaction. The New Accord’s risk management requirements would prompt big changes 
in both the core business and organisational structure; and improve corporate governance 
and enhance trust in the financial markets, as argued by Hashagen.14 Given the corruption, 
fraud, and Chinese banks’ large burden of bad debts that have been a major concern of 
foreign banks, improving risk management systems and strengthening banks’ corporate 
governance could only help banks in China increase their reputation and build up investor 
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confidence. (For a more extensive discussion of corporate governance and codes of 
conducts in China, see for example, Cai and Wheale.40) 
Proposition 3 posits the idea that compliance with advanced risk management systems 
favours the large banks only (that the large banks gain the greatest capital relief under 
Basel II and benefit from economies of scale) but it was not fully supported by the 
evidence gathered from the risk managers interviewed. Only around 39% of our 
respondents were in agreement with Proposition 3, based upon the three questions that 
were formulated to express proposition 3 (see Appendix B).  
The Basel II QIS3 report,2 however, asserts that the small ‘Group 2’ banks would 
significantly benefit from using the IRB Foundation Approach in contrast to the large 
banks which would appear to require a higher regulatory capital requirement when using 
IRB, although the small banks may lack the necessary financial resources and technical 
skills to develop the internal systems they would need to follow the IRB Approach.57   
The leading banks would benefit from a reduction of regulatory capital by implementing 
AIRB, and in general discussion with our respondents, the majority considered that the 
estimated costs of implementation are overstated for Chinese banks, and that in any event 
these costs are not major concern, at least for the leading banks which have already draw 
up plans to put the new international standards into practice. The CBRC actively 
encourages the nation’s major lenders to intensify their efforts to build an internal-rating-
based (IRB) approach, but lack of data and poor data quality are major challenges as they 
limit meaningful analysis (see, for example, Liu).6 Nevertheless, the ‘Big Four’ state-
owned banks have now agreed to make investment in the infrastructure to meet the 
requirements of Basel II, but that local banks are unlikely to comply in the short-term, 
thus lending some support for proposition 3.  
China does not yet participate actively in international financial markets, and their 
financial system has been shielded from external influences. With the increasing numbers 
of foreign banks entering into Chinese market, especially under the WTO commitment to 
fully open up its financial markets, the banking sectors’ problems, including, low 
capitalisation, large amounts of non-performing loans, corruption and fraud, are major 
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concerns of both the Chinese authorities and foreign investors.  However, China’s 
agreement to adopt international national accounting standards will give foreign investors 
more confidence in the quality of financial information provided by Chinese companies. 
5.2 Managerial Implications  
Developing international banking standards 
In the long-run, there is a tendency for international banking regulations to converge in 
order to increase trade in financial services and open-up international capital markets. 
Implementation of Basel II rules is not just about data and information systems, but 
involves focusing on risk measurement, risk allocation and the return on risks. The most 
prominent and well recognised gap for banks in China is insufficient consistent quality 
data for credit and operational risk assessments and risk estimate determination. 
Therefore, even though many banks in China may not adopt the Basel II regulations, 
leading banks in China should leverage Basel II as a good opportunity to conduct a 
detailed gap analysis – to review the existing data and collection process, develop a plan 
to collect missing data, and implement appropriate risk management systems and 
processes and supporting information technology infrastructures. By doing so, the leading 
banks in China should become more competitive in the long-run and more able to 
compete with foreign rivals.  
The trade-off between business benefits and implementation costs 
Calculating capital requirements under Basel II requires banks to implement a 
comprehensive risk management framework. Banks will have to carry more capital to 
cover unsecured loans than they do for secured loans but the risk management 
improvements may be rewarded by lower capital requirements – perhaps as high as 20% 
for the large banks.2 Basel II also provides banks with an opportunity to gain competitive 
advantage by allocating capital efficiently. However, these large implementation projects 
will also need a huge investment in IT systems, processes, and personnel. It is 
recommended that leading banks in China should carry out a quantitative analysis and 
work out the trade-off between capital supporting specific business, customers and 
products and the cost of implementation in order to benefit from implementing Basel II.   
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Core deficiencies 
A few leading banks in China, with the support of government, have improved risk 
management practices and are able to more easily meet the requirements of Basel II in 
the next few years. At the present time, most banks are still in the process of addressing 
some fundamental and core system issues, including NPLs and meeting minimum capital 
ratios to comply with the 8% requirement. However, as reported by the risk managers of 
the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission (see Appendix A) many banks with 
material NPL-exposures are moving very quickly through a combination of NPL 
restructuring and disposals through Asset Management Companies and securitisation to 
relieve the pressure on regulatory capital.8;9  It is essential that banks in China first 
address these structural deficiencies as priorities before progressing to Basel II 
implementation efforts. As banks estimate their risk by means of internal models and use 
these risk estimates to calculate minimum capital, an approach known as “internal rating 
based”, Basel II gives banks considerable leeway in how they measure risk. As different 
jurisdictions will interpret the requirements of Basel II differently, it will be interesting to 
monitor how Chinese subsidiaries controlled by foreign banks adopt the new regulatory 
framework.  
Building an independent regulatory structure 
The CBRC regulates banks and their conduct of business in China and was established in 
April 2003 as an independent banking supervisory authority under the State Council of 
the government. The Central Bank has been imposing some quantitative controls on bank 
lending, banking supervision, and monetary policy for some time. However, as a very 
young supervisory committee, the power of CBRC has not been fully exercised. Also, the 
lack of political independence of the CBRC in China leads to regulatory biased decisions. 
International firms, in particular, worry that they may be discriminated against. That does 
not mean that foreign banks will not operate in China (they do), but, as Howard arges,51 it 
does mean that their required rate of return is likely to be higher. The British and the 
American FSAs are particular example where the laws which were established gave 
government ministers no power to intervene in the regulatory decision-making process, 
nor power over its funding.  It follows that establishing an independent institution which 
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has the authority and the capacity to make tough decisions where necessary is crucial. 
The overall regulatory policy should be integrated into a coherent financial whole, and 
the operational decisions made by regulators need to be as insulated as far as possible 
from the political process. This is difficult to achieve, but it is nonetheless essential.  
Building an integrated regulatory system 
It is as well to note that there is a growing international trend towards integrated 
regulation. The idea for integrated regulation has not been instituted in China because 
there are more restrictions on the types of businesses which financial firms can undertake. 
The three financial sectors, banks, securities houses, and insurance companies are still 
quite distinct from each other. But it is expected to change in 2006 when banks will be 
allowed to carry on financial business in multiple financial areas.  London provides a 
good example of a single regulatory model. Some of the largest financial firms in the UK 
are a mixture of banks, securities firms and insurance companies, and have been 
relatively successful in operating that combination of functions. Establishing an 
integrated regulatory authority to face up to these ‘financial supermarkets’ works well. 
Another advantage of an integrated regulatory system, particularly relevant to China, is 
that it does allow scarce regulatory skills to be deployed to best advantage because it is 
easier to do that within a single authority.   
Developing a robust training programme and maintaining the skilled staff 
It is crucial to train and maintain skilled staff and create a more risk-aware culture.  There 
is a great shortage of skilled people in China with financial regulatory knowledge.  In the 
case of the CBRC, most staff are from administration departments or monetary control 
departments. The complexity of the new international regulations and fast growing 
financial service industry create a demand for specified regulatory expertise.  Also, 
traditionally, banks in China have dramatically under-invested in training and this trend 
needs to be reversed if banks in China are to achieve effective risk management. It is 
recommended that both banks in China and the supervisory commission should develop a 
robust training programme which involves board and executive management leadership, 
pilot programmes with select branches to stage implementation, and on-going training 
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processes for improving supervisory efficiency and capability.  Also, to create the 
incentives for people to do so, it is probably necessary to ensure that regulators are paid 
at reasonably competitive rates.  
Planning and technology enhancement 
Despite the criticality of data collection and management, banks in China are only at the 
very early stages of this process. Many planning processes stop at Pillar 1 data collection 
including transaction information and basic customer and ratings classification 
information. A well planned Basel II IT architecture should incorporate data warehouse, 
risk-weighted assets aggregation, reporting systems, counterparty identification, 
consistency of model ratings and so on, as recommended by Deloitte.50 Therefore, it is 
recommended for banks in China that the planning process must take a much more 
holistic approach, addressing fundamental data-warehousing concerns and Basel II 
requirements. A starting point for credit architecture planning should be a data diagnostic 
process based on the bank’s own portfolio structure and source systems. Moreover, it is 
recommended that replacing old systems rather than modernising existing ones should be 
considered as it is often more cost effective.  
Upgrading corporate governance  
Corruption, fraud and the Chinese banks’ large burden of bad debts, have been the major 
concerns of the regulatory committee and of retail investors. There is a crucial need for a 
clear strategy to upgrade corporate governance and disclosure polices. A clear code of 
conduct and principles would strengthen shareholder protection, and guard against fraud 
and embezzlement, as recommended by the Ernst and Young report.49 In particular, there 
is considerable value in ensuring that every company has an appropriate number of 
independent directors who are able to defend the interests of shareholders, particularly of 
minority shareholders.  High standards of disclosure and transparency are crucial in 
developing capital markets. The CBRC has attached particular importance to upgrading 
corporate governance standards in China. It is not easy to implement, but in the long-run 
it is necessary because it will improve China’s ability to respond to international 
competition, and to meet evolving good practice standards. Also, the government still 
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needs to strengthen laws against corruption, financial speculation, and misallocation of 
investment funds.  Indeed, partial reforms have tended to transfer power to newly 
emerged elites perpetuating a state-centred system that allows the continuation of these 
abuses of power. As Pei65 points out, 30% of gross domestic product has been lost by 
Chinese banks in loan write-offs and capital injections, foreign ownership of banks is still 
limited to a maximum of 25%, and the Communist party retains the power to appoint 
managers of its choosing. 
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Number  Chinese Bank Number China Bank 
1 Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) 13 People's Bank of China 
2 China Development Bank 14 ShenZhen Development Bank 
3 China Construction Bank (C0CB) 15 Beijing City Commercial Bank 
4 Industrial and Commercial Bank (ICB) 16 China Min Sheng Bank 
5 China Everbright Bank 17 China Merchants Bank 
6 ShangHai PuFa Bank 18 Export Import Bank of China 
7 GuangDong Development Bank 19 HongKong Bank 
8 Bank of China (Boc) 20 Ningbo International Bank 
9 Hua Xia Bank 21 ShenZheng Commercial Bank 
10 China Banking Regulatory Commission 22 PICC Life Insurance 
11 Bank of Communication 23 Zhong Hong Life Insurance 



































Questions to test propositions Agree % Disagree % Don't Know %
Proposition 1:
Basel II will improve risk management: reducing the risk of 
business failure, and strengthening the global financial 
system.
Questions:
1.Do you think the application of the New Accord – the Basel II 
banking regulations – will reduce the risk of business failure? 23 95.83% 0 0.00% 1 4.17%
2. Will Basel II influence the way banks in China manage and 
measure risk? 18 75.00% 4 16.67% 2 8.33%
3. Will Basel II affect corporate governance and strengthen the 
stability of the financial system? 19 79.17% 2 8.33% 3 12.50%
Average Total 20 83.33% 2 8.33% 2 8.33%
Proposition 2:
Basel II will improve capital allocation efficiency.
Questions:
1. Will Basel II affect the capital structure of Chinese banks? 17 70.83% 5 20.83% 2 8.33%
2. Are foreign banks investing in Chinese banking partnerships 
concerned that banks in China are not adopting the Basel II 
regulatory standards? 16 66.67% 7 29.17% 1 4.17%
3. Do you think that even those financial service institutions that 
are not required to comply with the New Accord, will, 
nevertheless, tend to use its advanced requirements as risk 
management and economic capital benchmarks in order to 
remain internationally competitive? 18 75.00% 5 20.83% 1 4.17%
Average Total 17 70.83% 6 23.61% 1 5.56%
Proposition 3:
Compliance with advanced risk management systems 
favours the large banks only, which gain the greatest capital 
relief under Basel II, and benefit from economies of scale. 
Questions:
1. Will your bank use an advanced internal ratings based   
approach (AIRB)? 2 8.33% 20 83.33% 2 8.33%
2. Will the advanced internal ratings based approach (AIRB) allow 
banks to hold lower levers of capital? 10 41.67% 3 12.50% 11 45.83%
3. Do you think that non-compliance with the Basel II regulations 
will reduce banking competitiveness?  16 66.67% 4 16.67% 4 16.67%
Average Total 9 38.89% 9 37.50% 6 23.61%
Note: Each of the 24 Chinese banks listed in the Appendix A has been treated as a single response to questions posed. 
